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Abstract
There is a growing recognition in psychosis research of the importance of hallucinations in
modalities other than the auditory. This has focused attention on cognitive and neural processes
that might be shared by, and which might contribute distinctly to, hallucinations in different
modalities. In this article, I address some issues around the modality-generality of cognitive
and neural processes in hallucinations, including the role of perceptual and reality-monitoring
systems, top-down and bottom-up processes in relation to the psychological and neural sub-
strates of hallucinations, and the phenomenon of simultaneous multimodal hallucinations of
the same entity. I suggest that a functional systems approach, inspired by some neglected aspects
of the writings of A. R. Luria, can help us to understand patterns of hallucinatory experience
across modalities and across clinical and non-clinical groups. Understanding the interplay
between modality-general and modality-specific processes may bear fruit for improved
diagnosis and therapeutic approaches to dealing with distressing hallucinations.
Introduction
Contributing significantly to the distress of psychotic illness and increasingly recognized as
part of the healthcare burden in other disorders, hallucinations cut across nosological bound-
aries with limited diagnostic specificity (Waters and Fernyhough, 2017). While the under-
standing of auditory hallucinations (AHs; ‘hearing voices’) has progressed in recent decades,
non-auditory modalities, such as visual, tactile, and olfactory, have tended to be neglected
in empirical psychosis research (Langdon et al., 2011; Waters et al., 2014; McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2017). While this is likely due to their lower frequency, it is known that visual hallucina-
tions (VHs) are reasonably common in psychotic disorders, with one recent review putting
their incidence at 27% (weighted mean prevalence; Waters et al., 2014). Although individuals
often experience hallucinations in more than one modality, there is only limited information
on hallucinations in which the same entity is perceived at the same time in more than one
modality: so-called ‘fused’ or simultaneous multimodal hallucinations (Goodwin et al.,
1971; Hoffman and Varanko, 2006).
This raises questions about the extent to which the processes underlying hallucination are
modality-general – liable to affect processing in different sensory modalities simultaneously –
or specific to modalities of perception. Theoretical models of hallucinations in a particular
modality (such as the inner speech misattribution model of AH; see below) may prove relevant
to understanding hallucinations in other modalities, or they may turn out to be modality-
specific. Although research into other modalities of hallucination lags behind research into
AH, translating concepts from one modality to another (such as the role of deficits in periph-
eral sensory systems, as in eye disease, in VH) may offer new perspectives on the roles of
sensory pathways and neurocognitive processes in generating hallucinations.
I begin by drawing out some candidate mechanisms identified in research into specific hal-
lucination modalities and examining whether they might be generalizable across the range of
modalities. I then consider some processes that seem likely to have relevance only for specific
modalities, before considering how the notion of functional systems (Luria, 1965) might help
us to reconceptualize the relations between modality-general and modality-specific processes
in hallucinations. Finally, I consider some issues of clinical and diagnostic significance.
My focus is on cognitive and neural processes implicated in the experience of hallucination
(particularly in psychosis, although with relevance for the range of other disorders in which
hallucinations occur) and in hallucinations that have no clinical significance. Factors such
as genetics, social adversity, trauma, and culture – strongly implicated in the aetiology of
hallucinations – are beyond the scope of this article.
Misattribution theories
In a dominant model of AH, inner speech is misattributed to an external source, resulting in
the experience of an alien voice (Feinberg, 1978; Bentall, 1990; Frith, 1992). This ‘inner speech
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misattribution’ model has been supported by cognitive and
neuroscientific studies (Ford and Mathalon, 2005; see
Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015, for a review). It has also
been criticized for failing to distinguish between varieties of
inner speech (Fernyhough, 2004; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007),
and neglecting social elements of hallucinatory experience
(Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2016).
Some authors have considered whether the inner speech
misattribution model might generalize to other modalities of
hallucination (Fernyhough, 2016). A modality-general process
in hallucinations might comprise a bias towards misattributing
aspects of internal imagery, in whatever modality it occurs, to
an external source. One challenge to such an account is the
very different incidence of hallucinations in different modalities.
If a modality-general process was involved, why would hallucina-
tions not be equally common in each modality? Someone liable to
misattribute their own internal auditory imagery (such as inner
speech) to an external source would presumably be equally likely
to misattribute olfactory, visual, or tactile imagery.
At first glance, this scenario seems unlikely given the reduced
incidence of hallucinations in other modalities, particularly the
tactile and olfactory (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017). One plausible
explanation for this pattern is that sensory modalities differ in
their salience, with some modalities (such as the auditory, the
typical channel for linguistic communication) being particularly
emotionally significant, especially with regard to their social sali-
ence (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2016). A modality-general
account would need to explain differing vulnerabilities across
modalities, including the possibility that experiences in a particular
modalitymight bemore salient or have greater affective significance
than those in others. Thinking about modality-generality in this
way thus usefully highlights specific open empirical questions.
A further issue is to define what would count as the analogue
of inner speech in each modality. In VHs, one could imagine that
what is misattributed is visual imagery. Consistent with this view,
patients with VHs in Parkinson’s disease have been shown to have
elevated visual imagery strength compared to controls (Shine
et al., 2015). While some progress is being made in understanding
musical hallucinations as misattributed ‘inner music’
(Fernyhough, 2016; Moseley et al., 2018), it is more challenging
to envisage an inner tactile sense (‘inner touch’) or inner olfaction
(‘inner smell’) that could be misattributed to an external agency in
the case of hallucinations. While voluntary and involuntary som-
atosensory and olfactory imagery (in the absence of actual sensa-
tions) are plausibly involved in typical human experience, these
kinds of imagery remain only weakly understood from an empir-
ical perspective, suggesting another way in which a modality-
general approach to hallucinations might stimulate research.
Reality-monitoring processes
A related candidate for a modality-general process in hallucina-
tions is reality monitoring, or the capacity to distinguish between
internally and externally generated experiences. Such accounts
have been closely associated in the AH literature with inner
speech misattribution (e.g. Bentall, 1990), but are not identical
with them. It is possible to imagine, for example, that inner
speech could be misattributed for reasons other than a reality-
monitoring problem (such as if the contents of inner speech
were ego-dystonic; Stephens and Graham, 2000), or that reality-
monitoring processes might not gain traction on inner speech
(if the latter, for instance, had a particularly privileged position
in consciousness, such that it was unlikely to be misattributed).
There is considerable evidence for reality-monitoring biases in
AH in patient samples (Brébion et al., 2000; Waters et al., 2004),
alongside equivocal evidence for general population samples
(Larøi et al., 2004; Garrison et al., 2017). Some studies have iden-
tified similar connections between reality monitoring and hallu-
cination proneness in VH (Brébion et al., 2008; Aynsworth
et al., 2017). In terms of brain processes, a significant body of
research has pointed to the role of the anterior medial prefrontal
cortex (amPFC) in reality monitoring (Mitchell and Johnson,
2009; Simons et al., 2017). Recent research has identified a spe-
cific candidate for a brain region playing a role in reality monitor-
ing, the paracingulate sulcus (PCS) (Buda et al., 2011). Garrison
et al. (2015) found that a 1 cm reduction in left-hemisphere
PCS length increased the likelihood of a schizophrenia patient
having hallucinations by 19.9%. This relationship did not vary
by modality, suggesting that amPFC reality-monitoring processes
associated with this structural feature of the brain might represent
a modality-general process in hallucinations, at least in clinical
groups.
These findings also point to general developmental morpho-
logical variation as a possible candidate for a modality-general
hallucination mechanism, consistent with neurodevelopmental
accounts of psychotic disorders. Support for this view comes
from findings of decreased sulcification (in the right hemisphere)
with the addition of one modality of hallucination beyond AH, in
a comparison of patients with both AH and VH with those with
AH only (Cachia et al., 2015). Further research is needed to deter-
mine whether a general decrease in gyrification or sulcification in
either hemisphere might correlate with the number of modalities
in which hallucinations are experienced (including olfactory,
tactile, etc.). That said, it is too early to rule out the existence of
modality-specific reality-monitoring processes that interact with
specific sensory pathways in different modalities (see, e.g.
Moseley et al., 2014). Future research that disentangles modality-
general and modality-specific reality-monitoring systems in the
same samples would contribute greatly to our understanding of
this issue.
Social agent representations
As noted above, one criticism of the inner speech misattribution
model has been that it places insufficient emphasis on social cog-
nitive processes in AH. Fernyhough (2004) has proposed that AH,
to the extent that they are misattributions of inner speech, should
be socially structured (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2016). Bell
(Bell, 2013; Wilkinson and Bell, 2016) has suggested that AH can
be best understood as aberrant activation of representations of
social agents, rather than of auditory stimuli. Support for this
view comes from several sources, including the incidence of AH
in individuals deaf from birth (Atkinson et al., 2007) and the
occurrence of ‘soundless voices’ (Janet, 1891). The fact that social
agents can be represented in all sensory modalities raises the
possibility that aberrant activation of such agent representations
constitutes a modality-general process in hallucinations.
One implication of such a view might be that aberrant activa-
tion of social agent representations should influence different sen-
sory modalities equally strongly. That is, a hallucination involving
the activation of a representation of one’s mother, say, should lead
the individual to experience that entity in the visual (and conceiv-
ably olfactory and tactile) modalities as much as the auditory.
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While certain modalities might be more salient than others (and
thus more likely to feature in such hallucinations; see above), the
model would predict that ‘fused’ (or simultaneous multimodal
hallucinations of the same entity) would be relatively common.
If activation of social agent representations is a modality-general
process, it is likely to trigger activations in multiple sensory
modalities simultaneously, including those that are most socially
salient.
The evidence does not support this view. Recently, Lim et al.
(2016) reported a lifetime prevalence of multimodal hallucina-
tions of 53%, higher than the 27% lifetime prevalence for uni-
modal hallucinations, in patients with schizophrenia spectrum
disorders. However, their data do not speak to the issue of simul-
taneous hallucinations of the same entity in different modalities,
and are thus not relevant to the question of modality-general acti-
vation of conceptual representations, including those of social
agents. Greater clarity on the definition of different types of multi-
modal hallucinations will be a benefit to future research on this
issue (Waters et al., 2014).
Evidence for genuine simultaneous multimodal hallucinations
remains limited. An article by Hoffman and Varanko (2006)
reported on three patients with fused hallucinations. A recent
study of 22 patients with psychotic disorders reporting VH
showed that 19 reported simultaneous multimodal hallucinations,
most commonly that of an image that talked to and touched the
patient (Dudley et al., 2018). This finding fits with a modality-
general view of hallucinatory experience as resulting from the
aberrant activation of particular conceptual representations (for
example, activation of a representation of ‘dog’ leading to a
percept of a dog in more than one modality). It is possible that
fused hallucinations are for some reason under-reported, and
future studies with larger samples should address this issue as a
priority. Reasons why activation of social agent representations
might be partial or biased in certain circumstances, thus not lead-
ing to full fused hallucinations, should also be investigated in
future research. For the present, one implication that can be
drawn from the apparent relative scarcity of fused hallucinations
is that hallucinations are unlikely to result solely from the
modality-general activation of conceptual representations.
Processing of prediction error
In recent years, the predictive processing framework has reinvigo-
rated hallucination research by offering an understanding of how
hallucinations can be understood as perceptual hypotheses arising
within a brain that predicts the consequences of its experiences,
rather than passively processing information from the environ-
ment. A particularly valuable strand of research has explored
how an overreliance on strong priors, combined with compro-
mised processing of prediction error, can lead to non-veridical
acceptance of perceptual hypotheses (Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
Hallucinations in all modalities undoubtedly involve a complex
interplay of top-down and bottom-up processes, and an increas-
ing focus on modalities other than the auditory may prove signifi-
cant for understanding these experiences across the spectrum of
psychiatric disorder and beyond.
To date, research within this framework has focused exclusively
on the auditory and visual modalities. With regard to AH, research
with both clinical (Horga et al., 2014) and non-clinical (Daalman
et al., 2012; Alderson-Day et al., 2017; Powers et al., 2017) samples
points to biases towards an expectation of linguistic, meaningful
percepts that trigger internally-generated representations, such as
speech imagery, resulting in non-veridical speech perception.
Supporting the involvement of aberrant processing of prediction
error, functional magnetic resonance imaging during hallucina-
tions demonstrates weaker sensory prediction error signals in
right auditory cortex, in comparison with controls (Horga et al.,
2014). In the visual modality, a study with early psychosis and
psychosis-prone healthy individuals showed a bias towards using
prior knowledge to discriminate between ambiguous visual images
(Teufel et al., 2015).
Despite considerable enthusiasm for predictive processing as a
framework for understanding hallucinations (Powers et al., 2016;
Griffin and Fletcher, 2017), there has been little attempt to estab-
lish whether the main constituent processes – over-dominant
priors and aberrant processing of prediction error – represent
modality-general or modality-specific processes. With regard to
priors, on the one hand these might be expected to be modality-
specific: a patient might, for example, have a bias towards detect-
ing linguistic, meaningful content in an auditory stream, but that
would not necessarily generalize to detecting perceptual content
in other modalities. Much hangs on the difficult question of
how priors are generated in the brain’s predictive system. The cur-
rent understanding of the brain as a device that generates percep-
tual priors on the basis of perception and action, rather than at
some modality-general (perhaps conceptual) levels, suggests
that over-dominant priors will be a modality-specific feature of
hallucinations.
It is unclear whether the same applies to the processing of pre-
diction error. It is possible to envisage scenarios in which error
processing is tied to the sensory architecture in which it occurs,
or alternatively is a modality-general feature of a specific brain’s
structural organization or cytoarchitecture – or (perhaps most
likely) is a combination of the two. Data from delusional syn-
dromes where anomalous sensory experiences occur (e.g. delu-
sional parasitosis or Cotard delusion) may be relevant for
understanding more about how perception and belief interact in
hallucinations. Teasing apart modality-general and modality-
specific components of predictive processing models of hallucin-
ation is likely to stimulate informative new research directions.
Other candidate processes
A further candidate for a modality-general process in hallucina-
tions is intentional cognitive inhibition (the ability to willingly
suppress cognitions), problems with which are purported to lead,
for example, to the intrusion of remembered material into con-
sciousness as hallucinations (Waters et al., 2003; Jardri et al.,
2016). While this association has been documented for AH
(Waters et al., 2006), there is currently no evidence for its relevance
for hallucinations in other modalities, and only two studies have
linked it to hallucinations in non-clinical populations (Paulik
et al., 2007; Alderson-Day et al., 2019). Further research is therefore
needed to establish whether intentional cognitive inhibition
represents a modality-general process in hallucinations.
Another process that may constitute a modality-general process
in hallucinations concerns attribution of personal agency. For
example, neuroimaging findings on the role of the supplementary
motor area in hallucinations point to it having a role in judgments
about whether an experience was self-authored or otherwise
(Raij and Riekki, 2012; Alderson-Day et al., 2017). This raises the
possibility that judgments about authorship of experiences might
be underpinned by neural mechanisms that operate across the
range of sensory modalities.
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The putative modality-general processes considered above are
not presented as mutually exclusive mechanisms, but rather as
processes that can be combined in different specific models of hal-
lucination. In contrast to these modality-general processes, factors
in hallucination proneness linked to particular peripheral sensory
systems are likely to represent modality-specific processes. An
obvious example is the kind of VH that results from vision loss
and eye disease (ffytche, 2009). Research is increasingly recogniz-
ing the importance of the auditory equivalent, hearing loss, and
its association with AH (Linszen et al., 2018). Although research
on olfactory hallucinations in psychosis is very limited (Langdon
et al., 2011), it is plausible that deficits in olfactory processing
might similarly relate to hallucinations in this modality. Further
research in these areas is likely to advance understanding of the
role of sensory input in hallucinations in distinct modalities,
including how it interacts with the brain’s mechanisms for produ-
cing and revising sensory predictions.
Network-specific processes: a functional systems approach
Hallucinations in the auditory and visual modalities are thought to
relate to specific networks whose aberrant connectivity results in
non-veridical perceptual experiences. In AH, considerable evidence
has amassed for fronto-temporal dysconnectivity, particularly
focused around left superior temporal gyrus (STG), resulting in
internally generated language (inner speech) being misattributed
to an external source (Alderson-Day et al., 2015).
In the visual modality, distinct patterns of resting-state connect-
ivity have been observed in patients with both auditory and visual
hallucinations, compared to thosewith AH only, particularly in net-
works involving the hippocampal complex (Amad et al., 2014).
Another study found no such VH-related connectivity difference
for hippocampal regions, but did demonstrate hyperconnectivity
between visual cortex and the amygdala for those with both AH
and VH (Ford et al., 2015). VHs have been associated with reduced
connectivity between visual areas and the default mode network
(DMN) during hallucinatory experience (Jardri et al., 2013).
These findings fit with what is known about the role of resting-
state networks in hallucinations more generally, particularly evi-
dence for atypical interaction between the DMN and networks
linked to cognitive control and salience. Reviewing the literature
recently, Alderson-Day et al. (2015) suggested that these findings
could be understood in terms of modality-general resting net-
works (such as the DMN) being implicated in hallucinations
along with modality-specific networks such as those underpin-
ning internal language generation.
It has been proposed (Fernyhough, 2010; Alderson-Day and
Fernyhough, 2015) that such networks can be fruitfully consid-
ered as examples of what Luria (1965) termed functional systems,
defined as systems of hierarchically organized processes working
together in shifting constellations of components, with inter-
changeable constituent components allowing for change in the
profile of the subsystems employed in achieving a fixed task
from one occasion to another.
While Luria’s insights (and those of his mentor, Vygotsky)
were acknowledged in early formulations of cognitive neuro-
psychiatry (e.g. Miller, 1986), their implications for understanding
psychopathology have rarely been examined. Luria’s rejection of
the ‘narrow localizationism’ that characterized nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century clinical neurology goes some way beyond
the acknowledgement that there needs to be a cognitive level of
analysis of psychopathological experiences running alongside a
neural one (see, for example, summaries of the principles of cog-
nitive neuropsychiatry in David, 1993, and Halligan and David,
2001). Some aspects of Luria’s account – such as the shaping of
functional systems by social developmental processes, and the
need for attention to the significance of neural disruption at dif-
ferent stages of development – are not directly germane to the
present discussion (although are highly relevant for neurodeve-
lopmental accounts of psychopathology; see, e.g. Alderson-Day
and Fernyhough, 2015). More significant for the present discus-
sion is Luria’s notion of interfunctional relations, whereby func-
tional systems are created through systems at lower levels of the
hierarchy ‘plugging in’ to each other in flexible ways. To give
one example, self-regulatory inner speech is, in Vygotskian–
Luria theory, understood as a functional system produced when
language comes to be used to regulate prelinguistic cognition
(Vygotsky, 1987; Fernyhough, 2010). Inner speech can itself go
on to form part of a functional system at a higher level of the hier-
archy, such as when it interacts with the social cognition system to
create dialogic inner speech (Alderson-Day et al., 2016).
The neglect of this aspect of Luria’s writings by cognitive
neuropsychiatry and related disciplines is not my focus here
(see Mecacci, 2005). Rather, I propose that Luria’s insights pro-
vide a useful way of thinking about the complex relations
among modality-general and modality-specific processes in hallu-
cinations. They enable us to understand how such processes work
together in accounting for different patterns of experience across
hallucination modalities, and offer a helpful conceptual frame-
work for understanding how aberrant patterns of neural connect-
ivity can affect cognitive function.
For example, one can propose a functional system implement-
ing a monitoring mechanism for judging the provenance (internal
or external) of linguistic material, thought to be atypical in at least
some forms of AHs. Such a system would encompass the inner-
speech generation system of left inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s
area) and STG (including Wernicke’s area), along with the
modality-general reality-monitoring system centered in the
amPFC. Disruption to the functional system, occurring at any
point along its anatomical range, would affect monitoring of
internal speech, fitting with findings that signal-detection per-
formance for auditory material can be affected by neurostimula-
tion to the STG (Moseley et al., 2014).
A functional systems approach can also help us to understand
how atypicalities in one part of a system can be compensated for
by flexibility in its other components (Luria, 1965; Fernyhough,
2010). For example, it is possible that AH in patient groups can
be distinguished from AH in individuals who do not seek clinical
help (so-called ‘non-clinical’ hallucinators) in terms of two inter-
acting processes: a modality-general reality-monitoring system in
the prefrontal cortex and a modality-specific increase in resting
activation in auditory areas (Garrison et al., 2019). Elevated base-
line activation in auditory cortex areas has previously been impli-
cated in AH (Hunter et al., 2006), and in the terms of the present
article would count as a modality-specific process. For example,
the ‘saturation hypothesis’ (Woodruff, 2004) holds that overacti-
vation of auditory cortex draws neurophysiological resources
away from the processing of external speech, accounting for find-
ings that AHs are associated with a reduction in responsivity to
external speech in relevant areas such as STG (Ćurčić-Blake
et al., 2017). In Garrison et al.’s model, clinical AHs require a
‘double hit’ of hyperactivation of sensory areas combined with a
prefrontal reality-monitoring deficit. In non-clinical hallucinators,
hyperactivation in the relevant sensory areas is compensated for
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by an intact reality-monitoring system. A functional systems
approach can thus help us to understand interactions among
neural systems across the clinical/non-clinical divide (Waters
and Fernyhough, 2019).
Another example of a functional system incorporating both
modality-general and modality-specific networks is proposed to
involve inner speech and social cognition networks (Fernyhough,
2010; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015). Neuroimaging evi-
dence supports the interaction of a left-hemisphere internal lan-
guage network with a right-hemisphere social cognition network,
suggesting a neural substrate for the experience of conversational
inner speech or inner dialogue (Alderson-Day et al., 2016).
Disruption to an inner speech–social cognition network might
result in AH with varying degrees of agentive properties, such as
non-personified voices, voices with aberrant or non-veridical social
representations, or ‘soundless voices’ in which a social agent is
represented but there is no concomitant auditory experience.
In sum, the present approach to understanding modality-
generality of hallucinations offers a way of building on existing
insights about mechanism, and showing how constituent pro-
cesses interact flexibly in creating overarching functional systems
at a higher level of the hierarchy – as ‘networks of networks’, as
well as interfunctional collaborations between component sys-
tems. The functional systems approach is distinctive from other
approaches to understanding brain-wide interactions among
neural systems, such as large-scale brain networks (Bressler and
Menon, 2010) and graph theoretical approaches (Bullmore and
Sporns, 2009). Rather than beginning with data-driven network-
general analysis of nodes and hubs, it begins by postulating inter-
actions among cognitive systems and hypothesizing, on the basis
of cognitive-neuroscientific evidence, about the neural networks
that might underpin those interactions. In addition, it emphasizes
that these dynamic processes can only be understood within a
developmental context, and highlights how they are intimately
intertwined with social and cultural factors (Luria, 1965;
Fernyhough, 2010).
As documented above, the functional systems approach leads
to many predictions that can be tested in empirical research.
Specific research priorities highlighted by this approach include
testing misattribution models of hallucinations in modalities
other than the auditory, determining why some modalities of
experience are more salient than others in the context of
modality-general processes, distinguishing modality-general
from modality-specific reality-monitoring processes, clarifying
the relation between activation of modality-general social agent
representations and activations in distinct sensory networks,
and determining the extent to which atypicalities in processing
of prediction error are specific to modalities.
Clinical and diagnostic implications
Accounting for the presence of hallucinations in all sensory modal-
ities, and the phenomenological richness of these experiences
(Woods et al., 2015), seems to require that models of hallucination
in psychotic illness will incorporate both modality-general and
modality-specific mechanisms. Given evidence that hallucinations
have little diagnostic specificity, understanding phenomenological
variation in terms of differing combinations of modality-general
and modality-specific features may be beneficial. For example,
hallucinations in psychotic disorders might combine atypicalities
relating to sensory processing (audition, vision) with a modality-
general reality monitoring deficit (often implicated in diagnoses
of schizophrenia), while non-psychotic hallucinations may lack
the latter feature.
An improved understanding of how such mechanisms interact
in specific modalities of hallucination across different diagnostic
categories will likely bring dividends for therapy and manage-
ment. For example, an individual presenting with serial multi-
modal hallucinations (VH at one time, AH at another) might
benefit from treatments targeted at modality-general processes,
such as reality monitoring, social agent representations, etc. An
individual who only experienced hallucinations in one modality
might gain more benefit from therapies aimed at modality-
specific processes, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, psychoe-
ducation, or neurostimulation related to the left-hemisphere
internal language system.
The higher prevalence in psychosis of hallucinations in the
auditory modality (and, to a lesser extent, the visual) should
not be taken as a motivation against the search for modality-
general processes. Language-related hallucinations may be par-
ticularly emotionally significant for a variety of reasons, including
their strong social salience (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough,
2016). Multimodal hallucinations, particularly simultaneous
multimodal hallucinations of the same entity, present an interest-
ing special case. Although apparently not as prevalent as
modality-general models might predict, it is likely that they are
under-reported as a function of the greater emphasis on AH
(Goodwin et al., 1971). This interpretation is supported by evi-
dence that even ‘classic’ AHs (hearing voices) are associated
with a range of other, particularly somatic, experiences simultan-
eously, which may not be picked up routinely in standard psychi-
atric assessments (Woods et al., 2015). Research has emphasized
the importance of individual differences in the likelihood of seek-
ing help for hallucinations (Peters et al., 2017), underlining the
need for detailed clinical inquiry, particularly relating to aspects
of hallucination that have tended to be overlooked by empirical
research but which nevertheless figure significantly in clinical
neurology and other disciplines. Reporting of fused and other
less typical hallucinations is likely to be influenced by social
and cultural factors, particularly when spiritual and religious
interpretations play a role (Fernyhough, 2016).
Conclusions
Understanding hallucinations in terms of separable
modality-general and modality-specific processes may bear fruit
for our scientific understanding of these experiences and their
clinical management for those who seek help. A functional
systems approach offers potential for understanding how such
processes interact in generating hallucinatory experience, but
also how they change over time – how, for example, the experi-
ence of hearing voices might change from being a threatening,
alien experience to something that is more readily accepted as
being ‘of the self’. Differing configurations of modality-general
and modality-specific processes might be a key to understanding
phenomenological variation across hallucination modalities,
which in turn might be significant for diagnosis and therapy.
Thinking about how hallucinations show commonality across dif-
ferent sensory domains, as well as how they are distinctive within
them, may prove a valuable stimulus for future research into this
significant human experience.
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